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DOWER RIGHTS
DOWER RIGHTS UNDER OIL AND GAS LEASES
W. LEWIS ROBERTS*
A widow's right to dower in interests created under oil and gas
leases, executed by her husband, varies in the different jurisdictions
where oil and gas are produced. There are different forms of leases in
use and different views held as to the nature of the rights created by
them. It is necessary, therefore, at the beginning of a study of the
rights of a widow of a lessor or of a lessee in such leases, to note those
different forms and the nature of the interests created therein before
we can arrive at any satisfactory conclusions regarding the dower rights
created therein.
There is a lack of uniformity in the contents of oil and gas leases.
One of the leading writers in this field of law sets out the following
provisions found in oil and gas leases: (i) The payment of a cash bonus
at the time of the execution of the lease; (2) A provision for a royalty
payment if oil is produced upon drilling a well; (3) An agreement
to drill a test well; (4) A positive provision imposing an obligation to
drill and a stipulation that unless production is found within the
term fixed, the lease shall expire; (5) Or an agreement giving the
lessee an option to drill a test well or to pay a rental for a definite term,
a "drill or pay" provision; and (6) A forfeiture clause for breach of
these conditions is usually added.1
Among the names that have been used in referring to oil and gas
leases we find the "unless" lease, also known as "Producers' Form 88."
This form has been held to convey a determinable fee to the lessee.2
Another authority states that oil and gas leases are to be classified,
first, with respect to the form of the granting clause; second, with re-
gard to the form of the habendum clause; and third, with reference
to the nature of the obligation, if any, to drill a well or wells, "or in
lieu thereof, to pay delay rentals."3
The difficulty of setting out categorically the different forms of
leases used in the production of oil and gas is readily seen when we
glance at the various forms considered by an outstanding authority in
this branch of the law. In his treatment of the habendum clause, Pro-
*Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
"Thornton, Oil and Gas (1932) § 75.
2Koening v. Calcate, 199 Miss. 435, 25 S. (2d) 763 (1946).
'Walker, Property Interests Created by Leases (1928) 7 Tex. L. Rev. i at ii.
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fessor Summers refers to (i) a definite term lease with option to re-
new; (2) a short term lease; (3) a short term lease with a "thereafter"
clause, used in "drill or pay" types of drilling clauses; (4) no-term leases;
(5) a fixed term and "as long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in
paying quantities"; and (6) the modern lease.
4
It is interesting to note, at this point, what property interests are
created by these leases. Since the courts of the various oil-producing
states seem to have their own ideas on this point, it is necessary to
bear this fact in mind when examining the decisions. It is also nec-
essary to bear in mind that the earlier decisions under oil and gas
leases were decided at a time when the rules of law as to solid minerals
like coal were well established and the courts applied these rules to the
first oil and gas cases.
Usually, we find the courts stating that oil and gas leases create
an interst in real property. Texas represents the extreme view in this
trend. It holds in keeping with the law governing mining coal and
other metals of a solid nature that the lessee acquires ownership to the
oil and gas in place. In a leading case on the point, the Texas court
observed: "We do not regard it an open question in this state that
gas and oil in place are minerals and realty, subject to ownership,
severance, and sale, while embedded in the sands of rocks beneath
the earth's surface, in like manner and to the same extent as is coal or
any solid mineral."5
In Zephyr Oil Co. v. Cunningham,6 the view of the court was that
"an oil and gas lease as a license creates a kind of incorporeal hered-
itament in and to lands, and as an estate it vests a determinable title
to oil and gas in place or produced from the same premises." The de-
terminable fee interest will last only so long as oil or gas is produced,
according to the ruling of the Texas Supreme Court.
7
At the other extreme seem to stand Kansas and West Virginia. The
courts in these states have referred to an oil and gas lease as a license
or chattel real but nevertheless have said that it creates personal
property interests. The question as to what interests are created under
these leases has come up in" actions for 'partition. In Charter v, Max-
well s the West Virginia court, after referring to earlier decisions, held
that leases similar to the one under consideration created for the
'2 Thornton, Oil and Gas (1938) 1o5 et seq.
5Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 16o, 254 S. W. 290
(1923). See Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 26o S. W. (2d) 676 (1953) (that lessee's
interest is a determinable fee in oil and gas in place, an interest in realty).
'265 S. W. (2d) 169 (Tex. Civ App. 1954).
7Norris v. Vaughn, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S. W. (2d) 676 (1953).
S132 W. Va. 282, 52 S. E. (2d) 753 (1919).
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lessees a chattel real, "which is personalty...." Being personal prop-
erty, an earlier judgment did not create a lien upon the undivided
interest in the leasehold estate. The Kansas court in Holland v. Shaf-
ferO said: "In this state an ordinary oil and gas lease is held to convey
no interest in the land therein described but to create merely a license
to explore, personal property." And in Tegarden v. Beers'0 the same
court held a royalty in oil and gas produced under the lease is not
realty and a contract to share such royalty with others did not run with
the land.
A majority of oil and gas producing states now designate the in-
terest created by ordinary oil and gas leases as a profit & prendre, as
an interest in the land." In Louisiana, it was said that it is a well es-
tablished principle in that state that mineral leases must be con-
strued as leases and that the Code provision applicable to ordinary
leases must be applied.12 A statute in New York states that interest
created under oil and gas leases shall be regarded as personal property
but shall be taxed as real property.13
Another fact that must be borne in mind in considering dower
rights created under oil and gas leases is that common law dower has
been abolished in some states and provisions in descent and distribu-
tion statutes substituted therefor. This is especially true of community
property states, many of which are leading producers of oil and gas.
Among these are California,14 Louisiana,15 New Mexico'6 and Texas.' 7
In many leading oil and gas producing states curtesy and dower
have been abolished and statutes enacted fixing the share of a surviv-
ing spouse in the estate of a deceased spouse. This is so in Indiana,'8
0162 Kan. 474, 178 P. (2d) 235 (1947).
'1'75 Kan. 61o, 265 P. (2d) 845 (1954).
"Continental Supply Co. v. Marshall, 152 Fed. 3o0 (C. C. A. xoth, 1946); Rob-
erts v. Tice, 198 Ark. 397, 129 S. W. (2d) 258 (1939); Basin Oil Co. of Calif. v.
Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 578, 271 P. (2d) 122 (1954); Walter v. Sohio Pet.
Co., 402 Ill. 33, 83 N. E. (2d) 346 (1950); Halbert v. Hendrix, 1l Ind. App. 43,
95 N. E. (2d) 2- (95o); Dempsey v. Diederick, 313 Ky. 865, 233 S. W. (2d) 976 (195o);
Homestead Exploration Corp. v. Shoregge, 81 Mont. 604, 264 Pac. 388 (1928); Koenig
v. Calcate, 199 Miss. 435, 25 S. (3d) 763 (1946); Exchange v. Poynter, 64 N. W. (2d)
718 (N. D. 1954); Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N. M. 97, 214 P. (2d) 864 (1950); Boat-
man v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P. (2d) 370 (1932).
"Dees v. Hunt Oil Co., 123 F. Supp. 58 (D. C. La. 1954).
1N. Y. Rev. Stat. (1883) c. 372; iA Summers, Oil and Gas § 156.
"Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 173.
"La. Civ. Code (Dart, 1932) §§ 915 et seq.
'IN. M. Stat. (1953) c. 27-1, 27-8, 27-9.
"1Te x. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1948) Art. 2571-2578.
"Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953) §§ 6-21o, 6-211.
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Kansas, 19 Oklahoma,20 and Pennsylvania.2 ' Common law dower is
given, with statutory changes, in the following group of oil produc-
ing states: Illinois, 22 Kentucky,23 Montana, 24 Ohio, 25 and West Vir-
ginia.2
6
Another statutory provision made for the surviving spouse and
the minor children of a married couple is that of homestead, the right
of a life interest in the premises that had been occupied by the couple
as a home before the death of one of them. This right is created by
statute and was nonexistent under the common law. The owner of a
homestead is entitled to share in rents and royalties derived from the
land. In Brandenburg v. Petroleum Exploration,27 the Kentucky
court did not apply this right to royalties from oil wells drilled under a
lease executed by her adult children after the homestead had been as-
signed. It said the Kentucky statute gave the homestead to a widow
so long as she should occupy the same and to the unmarried infant
children of the husband to occupy it with her until the youngest un-
married child should arrive at full age. This, the court held, did not
create an estate in land, but the right to use, occupy and enjoy the
surface. The same result was reached in Bartlett v. Buckner's Adm'r.
23
The Oklahoma court took a different view. In Lawley v. Richardson2o
the homestead owner was allowed to collect and use in her own right
the royalties from wells developed under a lease executed by her de-
ceased husband; and in Hembree v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,30 where
the homestead premises were subject to an oil and gas lease executed
by her husband, the widow's conveyance of her right as cotenant to
produce oil and gas was inconsistent with the right to use the royalties
under the lease in force when the homestead accrued and was a
waiver of such right.
In a Texas case a widow sued to set aside her homestead rights in
two tracts, one that was community property and the other the separate
property of the husband. Both tracts had been occupied by the plaintiff
"Kan. Gen. Stat. (1949) §§ 59-504, 59-508.
0Okia. Rev. Stat. (1951) C. 32, § 9(5); c. 84, § 213.
"Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) C. 12, § 6; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) C. 20,
§ 1.2.
"Il. Rev. Stat. (1953) Art. II, c. 3, §§ 162 et seq.
3Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§ 381.135, 391-090 et seq.
2Mont. Rev. Code (Choate & Wertz, 1947) C. 22, §§ 22.102-22.117.
5Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1954) C. 2103.
21W. Va. Code (Michie, 1955) c. 43, § 4096 et seq.
',218 Ky. 557, 191 S. W. 757 (1927).
'265 Ky. 747, 97 S. W. (2d) 805 (1936).
soi Okla. 40, 223 Pac. 156 (1924).
30176 Okla. 524, 56 P. (2d) 851 (1935)-
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and her husband as their homestead. She sued also to recover for oil
and gas royalties that had accrued since the husband's death. The
leases had been executed by the husband and his first wife, and he had
devised these tracts to his children by his first wife. Wells were drilled
on both tracts and were producing prior to the husband's death. The
widow was given homestead rights in half the community property
and in all the other tract and accrued royalties and such royalties as
might be derived from the lands as long as she used them as a home-
stead. The court admitted it followed Petrus v. Cage Bros.3 i with re-
luctance, since in Texas oil and gas were owned in place and the Petrus
case made the royalties "annual profits of the land." In Clayton v.
Canida,32 however, it held that "a surviving common law husband's
homestead interest in land of his deceased wife included the right to
appropriate oil and gas royalties produced during his life from wells
open prior to the wife's death as long as he should use the land as a
homestead, and was not restricted merely to the interest earned there-
from."
From these decisions it is obvious that a widow of an owner of
realty which has been used as the homestead of the couple while the
husband was living might get, by statute, possibly a better income from
oil and gas wells drilled and operated on such homestead lands under
leases executed by the husband prior to his death than she might get,
as we shall see, under the rules governing the dower rights of the widow
of a lessor of an oil lease.
Turning now to dower interests of the widow of the deceased les-
sor, it seems best to consider the decisions of the various oil and gas
producing states, in alphabetic order.
In Arkansas a widow's dower rights are set out in a 1945 act of the
legislature of that state. It reads: "If the husband dies, leaving a widow
and a child, or children, his widow shall be entitled, absolutely and in
her own right to one-third of all money received from the sale of
timber, oil and gas or other mineral royalty or mineral sales and one-
third of the money derived from any and all royalty run to the credit
of the royalty owners from any oil or gas well or royalty accruing from
production of other mines or minerals in lands in which she has a
dower and homestead interest, unless she shall have relinquished same
in legal form."33
Arkansas earlier had held that a lease was a license in land.34 The
Mi28 S. W. (2d) 537 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
2223 S. W. (2d) 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
DArk. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 61, § 204.
3'Clark v. Dennis, 172 Ark. io96, 291 S. W. 807 (1927).
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lessee at the inspection of the lease was said to have a possessory in-
terest protected by an action of ejectment.35 The court the same year,
1927, said it was well settled that in that state an oil and gas lease
conveyed an interest in land.3
6
As already noted, California has abolished the common law dower
and interest taken by the surviving spouse in the deceased spouse's
property is fixed by a provision of the Code.37 One-half the community
property belongs to the surviving spouse. In referring to oil and gas
leases, the court in Callahan v. Martin38 said the common law classifi-
cations were not applicable; and it has also said that interests acquired
under oil and gas leases are profits t prendre which vest in the lessee
an incorporeal hereditament, a present estate in land; consequently,
such interests come within the Code provisions covering the right of
succession.
Illinois and Indiana also come within the group of oil producing
states that have statutory provisions abolishing dower and curtesy
and giving the surviving spouse interests in the deceased spouse's estate
under the descent and distribution acts.
In Illinois, the earlier cases involving dower rights in oil and gas
leases referred back to mining cases, especially to the cases of Lenfer v.
Hanke3 9 and Priddy v. Griffith,40 and accepted the principles laid down
in those cases as far as they were adaptable to the oil situation, includ-
ing the doctrine of opened mines. The latter of these gave the widow
of a lessor interest in royalties from coal mines opened up by the lessee
after her husband's death.
A statute now gives the surviving spouse, where the decedent
leaves descendants, one-third of the personal estate and also one-third
of each parcel of real estate. If there are no descendants but the de-
cedent is survived by parents or other relatives, the proportions of de-
cedent's estate going to the surviving spouse differ. Provision is made
for the surviving spouse to elect to take dower instead of the portions
given her under the statute.4 1
As in Illinois, the early cases on dower under oil lease in Indiana
are based on their decisions worked out in coal mining cases, referring
in particular to the case of Hendrix v. McBeth42 where the widow of
'Henry v. Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana, 176 Ark. 133, 2 S. W. (2d) 687 (1927).
'ORoberts v. Tice, 198 Ark. 397, 129 S. W. (2d) 258 (1939).
-Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1953) §§ 201-203.
13 Cal. (2d) 110, 43 P. (2d) 788 (1935).
8'73 Ill. 405, 24 Am. Rep. 263 (1874).
'0150 Ill. 560, 37 N. E. 999 (1892).
"uSee note 21, supra.
261 Ind. 473, 28 Am. Rep. 68o (1878).
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the deceased lessor was given dower in the royalties received from coal
mines opened in the lifetime of her husband. A surviving spouse is
given certain interests in the estate of the decedent according to the pro-
visions of the statute of descent and distribution: 43 one-third of the
net estate if there are surviving two children or one child and issue
of a deceased child; one-half if but one child or issue of a deceased
child; three-fourths if no surviving issue, but the intestate is survived
by one or both parents, etc.
The Kansas statute provisions are very similar. If the decedent
leaves no children or issue of a previously deceased child, all the de-
cedent's property passes to the surviving spouse. If he leaves a child
or children or issue of a previously deceased child or children, one-half
of the entire estate goes to the surviving spouse. Another section
gives, under certain circumstances, the surviving spouse one-half the
realty of which the decedent was seized during the marriage.44 If the
deceased spouse leaves a will, the surviving spouse may elect to take
under the statute.45 In the recent case of In re Randolph's Estate46 the
husband elected to take under the statute. The court held that the
wife's lease did not work a disseverance of the oil and gas from the
land and her interest in the oil and gas as a lessor was real estate so that
the husband took one-half of the land and also one-half of the royalties
she had devised to a relative. In National Bank of Tulsa v. Warren,47
the court said: "'We have examined the authorities cited and relied
on by the plaintiff where we have held an oil and gas lease to create
personal property and conveys no interest in land. These cases are not
in point here. The question with which we are dealing is governed
entirely by the statutes4 8 we have discussed and the cases interpreting
them." The court was considering the necessity of recording a mort-
gage of an oil payment reserved out of the production of oil and gas
leases.
The Kentucky statute gives a surviving spouse one-third of the real
estate of which his or her spouse was seized in fee simple during cover-
ture and one-half of the surplus personalty.49 As shown in Crain v.
West,50 the widow is also entitled to rents and royalties in her hus-
" nd. Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1953) §§ 6-201 et seq.
"Ky. Gen. Stat. (1949) §§ 59.504, 59-505.
'Ky. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 59.2233.
"175 Kan. 685, 266 P. (2d) 315 (1954).
A177 Kan. 281, 279 P. (2d) 262 (1955).
"Ky. Gen. Stat. (1949) § 79.3101.
"Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) § 392.020.
"191 Ky. 1, 229 S. W. 51 (19i). See Collins v. Lemaster, 232 Ky. 188, 22 S. W.
(2d) 567 (1929).
22 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII
band's dowable estate until dower is assigned. In that case, the statute
was construed to give the wife profits and royalties from oil wells
opened in the lifetime of the husband. She was given one-third the royal-
ties outright from the death of the husband until dower was assigned.
On appeal from an adverse ruling of the trial court in an action by
a widow to set aside assignments of oil and gas leases, made by her
husband without consideration and without his wife's knowledge, the
Court of Appeals said: "In this state a widow is entitled to dower in
mineral leases owned by her husband." 51 However, in Van Camp v.
Evans,5 2 growing out of the same set of facts, the court held the widow
was not entitled to dower in the particular leases since the husband
was not seized of a fee simple estate in them. It was provided in the
leases that the lessee covenant to begin a well on the premises within
fifteen days and to drill other wells within specified times, and forfeiture
for failure to drill as required was provided for. This did not create a
fee simple estate in the lessee in which his widow would be entitled to
dower under the statute. The court approved the statement in Swiss Oil
Corp. v. Hupp53 that the right of such a lessee is limited to exploring
and producing, and does not acquire any title to the oil until it has
been taken from the ground.
Bartlett v. Buckner's A dm'r54 was a case in which two widows were
each entitled to interest for life on one-third of one-eighth of such
royalties, where their husbands had owned a one-eight interest in the
oil and gas leases. However, one who had elected to claim homestead
rights in her husband's land was held not entitled to participate in
the oil royalty.
In the recent decision of Mills v. Taylor,5 5 the court noted that the
general rule was recognized in Kentucky that "a life tenant is entitled
to the rentals and royalties accruing under a gas and oil lease as part of
the profits of the land if the land was being exploited under such lease
at the time of the acquisition of the life estate."
As recently as 1946, the Louisiana court applied the strict rule as
to "open mines" to an oil lease case and said the widow of the lessor
was not entitled to the royalties from wells opened on a half-interest of
community property after the death of her husband but was entitled
to royalties from wells on another tract which had been developed
in her husband's lifetime. 56 It said that under the Louisiana Code the
5'Pursifull's Adm'r v. Pursifull, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S. W. (2d) 967 (1944).
r'3o6 Ky. 59, 206 S. W. (2d) 38 (1947).
5'353 Ky. 552, 564, 69 S. W . (2d) 1037, 1043 (1934).
"265 Ky. 747, 97 S- W. (2d) 8o5 (1936).
5268 S. W. (2d) 412 (Ky. 1954).
5'Gulf Refining Co. v. Garrett, 2o9 La. 674, 25 S. (2d) 329 (1946).
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usufructuary had no right to mines and quarries not opened when the
usufruct commenced. The federal court in Louisiana has said that an
oil and mineral lease in Louisiana or a royalty interest creates an
interest in real property and is governed by the same rule that governs
property rights.5 7
As early as 1892 it was settled in Michigan that a widow was en-
titled to one-third of the royalties that accrued under a lease made
by the remaindermen, with the court's permission, although the mines
had not been opened during her husband's lifetime.58 The statute in
that state gave a widow a life estate in one-third of the land whereof
her husband was seized in fee simple during marriage.
The Michigan court did not allow a widow dower in oil and gas
leases given for five years "and so long thereafter as oil and gas or either
of them, is produced from said land by lessee." It said this was not an
estate of inheritance, since oil and gas could not be produced forever
within the terms of the leases.59
The Mississippi code provisions are sufficiently broad to make the
statutory substitution for dower cover any interest a deceased spouse
may have had in any oil and gas interests.60 Where an intestate leaves
no children or descendants, the entire net estate goes to the surviving
widow. If he leaves children or descendants, his widow is given a
child's part. Dower as such is abolished in Mississippi.
The Montana code gives the widow a one-third dower interest in
the real estate of which her husband was seized during the marriage
It includes equitable estates as well as legal. Where there are no issue
living, she has an election whereby she can take one-half.01 A recent
decision under the code 62 gave the widow dower in an unpatented
mining claim.03
New Mexico likewise abolishes dower and makes provision for a
surviving spouse to take under the statute of descent and distribu-
tion.0 4 It regards grants or reservation of royalty rights as grants and
reservations of "real property."0 35
ZAngichiodo v. Cerami, 28 F. Supp. 720 (D. C. La. 1939).
nSeager v. McCabe, 92 Mich. 186, 52 N. W. 299 (1892).
nRedman v. Shaw, 3oo Mich. 314, 1 N. W. (2d) 555 (1942).
60Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §§ 470, 478.
"Mont. Rev. Code (Choate & Wertz, 1947) §§ 91.401 et seq.
C2Mont. Rev. Code (Choate & Wertz, 1947) §§ 22.101, 91.2607, 91.26o8.
clClark v. Clark, 242 P. (2d) 992 (Mont. 1952).
"N. M. Stat. (1953) §§ 2o9-1(7), 2-1-0o).
See Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N. M. 97, 214 P. (2d) 864 (1950); Duval v.
Stone, 54 N. M. 27, 213 P. (2d) 212 (1949); Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N. M. 564,
203 Pac. 539 (1922).
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Oklahoma is another of the states that have abolished common law
dower and given the widow of an intestate property owner a share of
intestate's holding in lieu thereof. In Aldridge v. Houston Oil Co. 60 the
widow was given absolutely one-third of the annual rentals and delay
money contracted for an oil lease and not merely the interest of one-
third of such payments. The court distinguished between rent and roy-
alties in connection with oil and gas leases. Rent, it said, was a term
applied to the privilege of boring for oil and gas and for delay in be-
ginning operations, while royalty is a percentage of the oil and gas
after it is found. In a very recent case, the Oklahoma court held that a
life tenant is entitled to rents and royalties accruing from mines and oil
wells existing at the death of a testator or which may be opened under
a conveyance or a lease executed prior to vesting of the life estate. In
the particular case the will vested a life estate in the testator's widow.
It said that unaccrued royalties, which mean oil and gas and other
minerals, are usually treated as real property.
67
The Pennsylvania case of Bubb v. BubbOs gave the husband curtesy
in his deceased wife's lands and royalties received after her death under
oil and gas leases, which were executed prior to the inception of his life
estate. The court in its earlier cases was influenced by its holding in
coal mining law. The surviving spouse's share in the intestate's estate is
fully set forth in the statute of descent and distribution which has re-
placed common law dower and curtesy.69
The situation is similar in Texas. The statute gives the surviving
spouse one-third of the lands of the intestate for life with remainder to
the child or children of intestate. If there are no children or descend-
ants, one-half of the estate of the intestate goes to the surviving spouse.
If there are no surviving children, parent, brother, sisters or descendants
thereof, the entire estate goes to the surviving spouse.7 0 In accordance
with this statute a surviving widow was held entitled to a life estate
to one-third of the one-eighth of the mineral royalties in the entire tract
of land in question.71 In Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 72 where
the wife died intestate, leaving no children or descendants and no
parents surviving her, the husband was given one-half of the wife's
realty and the wife's brothers and sisters were allowed to take the other
61116 Okla. 281, 244 Pac. 782 (1926).
07in re Shailer's Estate, 266 P. (2d) 613 (Okla. 1954).
682ol Pa. 212, 50 Ati. 759 (1912).
09Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) c. 20 § 1.2.
7OTex. Civ. Stat (Vernon, 1948) Art. 2571.
7'Belote v. Brown Securities Corp., 129 S. W. (2d) 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
s8i S. W. (2d) 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
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half. In another case the court, noting that the oil and gas in place
were part of the "corpus" of the land itself, held the surviving wife
was entitled to oil and gas royalties accruing from her husband's
homestead and not merely income from the royalties. 73 In Thompson
v. Thompson,74 the "open mine" doctrine was applied, and the wife
was given a life tenancy in the royalties from oil wells producing at the
time the life estate came into being.
The Virginia court, after stating the rule, set forth in Corpus
Juris, 7 5 as to a widow's right to work mines opened in the lifetime of
her husband, quoted with approval from the text: "So where the land
is subject to oil and gas leases, the widow is entitled to dower in the
rents or royalties, even of wells thereafter drilled." 76
A West Virginia statute fixes the proportion of an intestate's estate
that goes to the surviving spouse.77 Confusion was introduced into the
question by one of the earlier oil lease cases.78 The wells produced
after assignment of dower and partition of the land. It was held that
the widow was entitled to dower in all the royalties and rents accruing
from wells on the entire tract. This holding was overruled in Musgrove
v. Musgrove,70 which case made it doubtful whether, after dower has
been specifically assigned, the widow would be entitled to share from
wells on other parts of the land. It was said: "She may take and appro-
priate to her use the issues of profits of the real estate assigned her, but
must not destroy or remove the corpus thereof." The later cases allow
the owner of a subdivision the right to only the royalties from oil wells
produced on his subdivision.80
Wyoming has abolished curtsey and dower and made provision for
a surviving spouse to share in the intestate spouse's estate, in amounts
varying according to whether there are surviving children, descendants
and other relatives.8 1
In passing we should take notice of the fact that in very recent
years North Dakota has become an important oil producing state.
It has abolished curtsey and dower,8 2 and code provisions give the
order of succession of property.8 3
XNVhite v. Blockman, i6S S. W. (2d) 531 (Tev. Civ. App. 1942).
7'149 Tex. 632, 236 S. W. (2d) 779 (1951).
719 C. J. 469.
"Graham v. Smith, 17o Va. 246, 196 S. E. 6oo (1938).
71W. Va. Code (Michie, 1955) §§ 4089, 4096, 4731.
7'Campbell v. Lynch, 81 W. Va. 374, 94 S. E. 739 (1917).
7086 W. Va. 119, 103 S. E. 302 (1920).
See Pridemore v. Lucas, 131 W. Va. 1, 47 S. E. (2d) 839 (1946).
6lWyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) § 6-2501.
-N. D. Rev. Code (1943) § 56-0102.
5N. D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 30-1705, 56-1014.
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To recapitulate: the problem of whether a widow of one who has
rights under an oil and gas lease is entitled to dower calls for consider-
ation first of what property interests are created by oil and gas leases
and what statutory changes in the various oil producing states, es-
pecially those abolishing common law dower, have been enacted.
There is no uniformity in the decisions as to the nature of the
property interests created. Texas rulings, for instances, are based upon
the propositon that oil and gas, since they are minerals, are subject
to ownership in place. Many other states that at first accepted this view
now regard oil and gas leases as creating "profits A prendre," "chattels
real" or " incorporeal hereditaments."
Some leases are given for definite periods of time and some to last
as long as oil and gas are produced in paying quantities. The former
gives a term of years and creates a chattel real, not subject to dower,
and the latter is said by many courts to create determinable fees.
A surviving'spouse may be given a homestead in lands occupied by
the couple as a homestead. This right is given by statute and was un-
known at common law. The survivor is given a life estate in such prop-
erty and may continue to operate oil and gas wells that were opened
at the time the estate came into being.
In community property states, (and several of the leading oil and
gas producing states do follow the community property law) statutes
fix the interest the survivor takes in such property, usually one-half
absolutely. In jurisdictions that have abolished dower as such or great-
ly modified the right, shares in the intestate spouse's estate are provided
for under descent and distribution statutes, varying from one-third
to the entire estate, depending upon the relatives the decedent leaves
surviving him or her.
Those having dower or curtesy have life estates and were originally
allowed to continue to operate oil and gas wells that were in produc-
tion when the life estate came into existence. This has now been
changed to allow the owner of such an estate to have the royalties
from wells opened up under leases executed by the deceased spouse
during his or her lifetime.
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